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I. Introduction
This Article summarizes and discusses important developments in West
Virginia oil and gas law between July 1, 2015, and June 30, 2016. This
Article is divided into two Parts. The first part will discuss common law
developments in both State and Federal courts. The second part will discuss
statutory developments in both enacted and proposed legislation.
II. Judicial Developments
Courts in West Virginia have been relatively busy over the last year
deciding issues related to oil and gas development in the state. This section
will first discuss the single oil and gas case decided by West Virginia’s
highest court. Next, decisions issued by West Virginia’s federal district
courts, which have been particularly busy, and a decision by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals will be discussed and presented in chronological
order as the decisions were handed down by the courts.
A. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
In Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Hickman,1 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, a ruling
from the Circuit Court of Ohio County that denied a motion to compel
arbitration and granted lessors’ motion for summary judgment.
Four siblings (the “Hickmans”) owned a 143 acre tract of land (1/4 each)
in Ohio County, West Virginia. 2 Four different leases signed in 2005,
2006, January 2011, and in February 2011 were at issue. 3 Also relevant to
the case was a lease signed by the Hickmans in 2001. 4 The 2001 lease was
negotiated by William Capouillez,5 a geologist who operated a company
that negotiated leases on the behalf of mineral owners.6 Three siblings
signed the 2001 Lease at the same time, then, the signed leased was mailed

1. 781 S.E.2d 198 (W. Va. 2015).
2. Id. at 204.
3. Id. at 204-08.
4. Id. at 204.
5. Mr. Capouillez was a defendant in this case. For more about Mr. Capouillez, see
Geological Assessment & Leasing v. O’ Hara, 780 S.E.2d 647 (W. Va. 2015), in which the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered certain issues relating to allegations
that Mr. Capouillez engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
6. Chesapeake Appalachia, 781 S.E.2d at 204.
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to the forth sibling, Cecil, which he signed. 7 Cecil contended this
established a pattern of dealing with Mr. Capouillez. 8
The first lease (the “2005 Lease”), a lease to Great Lakes Energy
Partners, LLC (now Range Resources—Appalachia, LLC) (“Range”) was
only signed by three siblings, not Cecil, even though he was listed as a
lessor. 9 Mr. Capouillez was listed as a “consultant” on the lease and was to
receive a share of the bonuses and royalties. 10 The lease also contained an
arbitration clause that stated “any controversy or claim arising out of or
relating to this Lease . . . shall be ascertained and settled by arbitration.”11
Again, Cecil Hickman never signed this lease.
The second lease (the “2006 Lease”) was sent to Cecil Hickman by
Range in 2006 which contained the same extension language and arbitration
clause as the 2005 Lease.12 Cecil signed both the lease and a memorandum
of lease, had them acknowledged, and sent them back to Range. 13 Cecil
contended that he never dated the documents and that Range had
fraudulently filled in the effective date of July 19, 2006. 14 Cecil thought he
was just agreeing to the lease his siblings had signed in 2005. 15 To add
another layer of intrigue, the memorandum of lease incorrectly identified
the parcel as being in Brooke County, West Virginia,16 where it was filed in
the county clerk’s office. 17 Mr. Capouillez was again listed on the lease as
a “consultant.” 18 This lease, along with the 2005 Lease, was assigned to
Chesapeake Appalchaia, LLC (“Chesapeake”).19
The third lease (the “January 2011 Lease”) was between Chesapeake and
all four siblings! 20 However, the lease was not signed by Chesapeake or any
of its agents. 21 Cecil Hickman alleges that an agent of Chesapeake
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 205.
11. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Id. at 206.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Brooke County borders Ohio County to the north in West Virginia’s Northern
Panhandle.
17. Chesapeake Appalachia, 781 S.E.2d at 206.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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contacted him the lease was signed to inform him that he was still under
lease by the 2006 Lease and that none of the siblings would receive the
promised bonuses of the January 2011 Lease unless they agreed to remove
Cecil from it. 22 This lease contained a clause stating that “Chesapeake
retains the right to surrender the Lease . . . at any time and for any
reason.” 23
Lastly, the fourth lease (the “February 2011 Lease”) was a top lease
signed by Cecil Hickman, which he claims he acquiesced to out of duress
that his siblings would not receive their bonuses under the January 2011
Lease. 24 Again, the lease was not signed by Chesapeake or any of its
agents. 25 Cecil’s three siblings were paid their bonuses and work began on
the leased premises that Chesapeake contends was sufficient to constitute “a
bona fide attempt to secure . . . the production” of oil and gas, thus locking
in Cecil under the 2006 Lease. 26
Cecil Hickman filed suit, pursuing a number of claims. First, that he was
bound by the 2005 Lease as there had been a “meeting of the minds” and
that this lease had expired when they signed the January 2011 Lease. 27
Second, that Mr. Capouillez was negligent, incompetent, and had breached
fiduciary duties. 28 Third, that Range had fraudulently altered the 2006
Lease and had published statements derogatory to his title.29 Fourth,
Chesapeake’s agents fraudulently induced him to sign the February 2011
Lease. Lastly, that Chesapeake had breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, mishandled leases, published false statements about
his title, and engaged in the tort of outrage.30
The trial court ruled that the 2006 Lease (no meeting of the minds) and
February 2011 (mistakes of fact and misrepresentation) were void, the 2005
Lease had expired, and that the parties were compelled to arbitrate their
claims under the January 2011 Lease.31 However, Chesapeake was ordered
to pay Cecil his bonus under the January 2011 Lease to avoid its failure for
lack of consideration. 32
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 207-08.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 209-10.
Id. at 210.
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On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s decision that the February 2011 Lease was void and
unenforceable as it was acquired through mistake of fact and
misrepresentation. 33 The Court also affirmed the decision that Chesapeake
must pay Cecil his bonus if it wanted to compel arbitration under the
January 2011 Lease, but disagreed that Chesapeake needed pay Cecil
royalties because that would be a question for arbitration.34 However, the
Court reversed and held that Range and Mr. Capouillez do not have to
arbitrate under the January 2011 Lease.35 In its holding, the Court found
five theories under which a signatory to an arbitration agreement can bind a
non-signatory: “(1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency;
(4) veil-piercing/alter ego; and (5) estoppel.” 36 The Court held that Mr.
Capouillez and Range were not bound by the arbitration agreement in the
January 2011 Lease because none of these five theories were satisfied.
Furthermore, the Court also found that the trial court had failed to analyze
the 2005 Lease and the 2006 Lease under the Federal Arbitration Act and
must do so on remand. 37
B. Federal Courts
In Statoil USA Onshore Properties Inc. v. Pine Resources, LLC, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
granted Statoil’s motion for summary judgment finding it had no obligation
to perform drilling requirements contained in a prior agreement. 38
Pine owned a 565-acre parcel in Barbour County, West Virginia.39 In
2008, Pine sold its mineral rights in the property to PetroEdge, retaining for
itself an 18% overriding royalty interest.40 Pine and PetroEdge entered into
a Purchase and Sale Agreement (“PSA”) requiring that PetroEdge would
“apply for a meter tap on a gas transmission line within sixty days of
execution . . ., spud one well within one year after installation of the meter
tap, and spud three wells (including the first well) within five years after

33. Id. at 213.
34. Id. at 220.
35. Id. at 221.
36. Id. at 217 (citing Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d
349, 352 (2d Cir. 1999)).
37. Id. at 222.
38. No. 2:14-cv-021169, 2015 WL 5304295, *4 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 9, 2015).
39. Id. at *2.
40. Id.
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installation of the meter tap.” 41 PetroEdge did not complete any wells on
the property. 42 In 2012, PetroEdge sold its mineral ownership to Statoil. 43
Statoil filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that it owed no
obligations to Pine under the PSA. 44 Pine counterclaimed, alleging breach
of contract and sought specific performance.45 Both parties filed motions
for summary judgment. 46
At issue was the PSA, specifically, the identification of the parties to the
PSA and the obligations of the “Purchaser.” 47 PetroEdge was designated as
the Purchaser in the PSA. 48 Statoil argued that the drilling obligations in
the PSA only applied to PetroEdge, relying on Section 7.2 49 of the PSA. 50
Pine argued that Statoil became the “Purchaser” and that Section 8.8 51
applied the terms of the PSA to the successors and assigns. 52
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at *3.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at *2.
48. Id. at *6.
49. Section 7.2 of the PSA states that
(a) The representations and warranties of the Parties in Articles 3 (except
Section 3.7) and 4 and the covenants and agreements of the Parties in Article 6
(sic ) (except Section 5.4 through 5.9) shall survive the Execution Date for a
period of two (2) years. The representations, warranties, covenants and
agreements of Seller in Sections 3.7 and 5.4 shall survive until the close of
business 30 days after the expiration of the applicable statutes of limitation
(including any extensions thereof) provided that any proceeding or
indemnification claim pending on the date of any such termination shall survive
until the final resolution thereof. The remainder of this Agreement shall survive
the Execution Date so long as Purchaser holds any interest in the Mineral
Rights. Representations, warranties, covenants and agreements shall be of no
further force and effect after the date of their expiration, provided that there
shall be no termination of any bona fide claim asserted pursuant to this
Agreement with respect to such a representation, warranty, covenant or
agreement prior to its expiration date.
Id. at *2.
50. Id. at *6.
51. Section 8.8 of the PSA states that
[a]ny assignment by Seller of all or any part of its rights with respect to the
Excluded Mineral Rights or any related interests shall be made expressly
subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, and such assignment not
in compliance with this Section 8.8 shall be void ab initio. Subject to the
foregoing, this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the
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The court granted Statoil’s motion for summary judgment. 53 First, the
court found the PSA language to be clear and unambiguous. 54 The specific
terms of Section 7.2 of the PSA states that the PSA will remain in effect “so
long as Purchaser holds any interest in the Mineral Rights.” 55 PetroEdge
was specifically identified as the Purchaser. 56 Accordingly, only PetroEdge
was obligated under the PSA. 57 Furthermore, Section 8.8 did not modify
the remainder of the contract.58 Lastly, Statoil was not estopped by
ratification because “a contract, if ratified at all, must be ratified as a
whole.” 59 Pine has filed an appeal to United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.
In SWN Production Co., LLC v. Edge, 60 the United States District Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia granted the oil and gas
company’s motion for a preliminary injunction so it could enter onto
defendant’s land to “explore, drill, and develop the area for oil and gas
operations.” 61
The defendants own the surface of 87.85 acres in Marshall County, West
Virginia. 62 The oil and gas interests were excepted and reserved in the
conveyance granting the defendants their tract of land. 63 At the time of that
conveyance in 1980, the property was subject to a 1977 lease to Columbia
Gas Transmission Corporation. 64 In 2010, the owners of the oil and gas
interests leased the property to NPAR, LLC with the “exclusive right to
explore, drill, develop, and conduct oil and gas operation, plus all other
rights and privileges that are necessary or land covered hereby.” 65 The
plaintiff acquired the rights to that lease and it was renewed in 2015. 66 The

Parties hereto and their respective successors and assigns.
Id. at *2.
52. Id. at *3.
53. Id. at *6.
54. Id. at *5.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. No. 5:15CV108, 2015 WL 5786739 (N.D.W. Va. Sept. 30, 2015).
61. Id. at *1.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *2.
66. Id.
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plaintiff had permitted and planned to operate a well on the property by
October 2015. 67 However, in July 2015, the defendants denied the
plaintiff’s personnel entry onto the property and continued to deny entry. 68
The plaintiff filed suit seeking a preliminary injunction and a declaratory
judgment of its rights under the lease. 69 The defendants alleged that the
plaintiff did not have the right to enter their property and that it cannot use
the surface of their property to drill a horizontal well to extract oil and gas
from neighboring lands. 70
The issue before the court was whether the 1977 and 2010 leases and the
1980 deed give the plaintiff the express right to use the land as proposed. 71
Specifically, the defendants argued that the reservation in the 1980 deed
incorporated by reference the 1977 lease and that any reservation in the
deed expired with that lease. 72 However, under West Virginia law, “parties
may incorporate into their contract the terms of some other writing.” 73 The
reservation in the deed is as follows:
There is excepted and reserved from this conveyance, however,
all of the oil and gas, in and underlying said land, together with
all of the rights to enter upon said land to explore, drill for,
produce and market all such oil and gas as said rights are set
forth in the lease from Harold H. Fisher and Dorothy L. Fisher,
his wife, to Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation, by lease
dated May 3, 1977, and recorded in the office of the Clerk of the
County Court of Marshall County, West Virginia, in Deed Book
460, page 351. 74
The court granted the preliminary injunction finding that the plain
language of the deed is clear and unambiguous and that the reference to the
1977 lease in the 1980 deed merely illustrates the scope of the rights
reserved. 75
In Equitrans, L.P. v. 0.56 Acres More or Less of Permanent Easement
Located in Marion, County, West Virginia, 76 the United States District
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *1.
Id.
No. 1:15CV106, 2015 WL 7300548 (N.D.W. Va. Nov. 18, 2015).
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Court for the Northern District of West Virginia granted Equitrans’s
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the counterclaims of vexatious litigation and
trespass by landowners and denied the landowners’12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. 77 The current suit arose out of a previous suit wherein the
landowners, the Moores, won a jury trial that found that Equitrans had
violated a pipeline right-of-way or had trespassed by maintaining a pipeline
outside of the right-of-way. 78 The court stayed an execution of the
judgment so Equitrans could seek a condemnation of the right-of-way, the
subject of the current litigation.79 The court found the Moores failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that Equitrans’s claims
were sufficiently plead. 80 In K & D Holdings, LLC v. Equitrans, L.P., 81 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a decision by
the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia
that a lessee had abandoned its oil and gas lease.
K & D Holdings is the lessor and Equitrans is the lessee of oil and gas
rights to 180 acres in Tyler County. 82 Equitrans sublet its rights to EQT to
produce gas from subsurface formations that are not used for the storage of
gas or protection of stored gas. 83 EQT has not engaged in the exploration
or storage of oil and gas on the property, but it has engaged in the
protection of stored gas. 84 Part of the property is within a 2,000 foot buffer
zone established by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to protect
Equitrans’s nearby Shirley Storage Field.85 The Durational Provision of the
lease read:
To have and to hold the said land and privileges for the said
purposes for and during a period of 5 years from December 2,
1989, and as long after commencement of operations as said
land, or any portion thereof or any other land pooled or unitized
therewith as hereinafter provided, is operated for the exploration
or production of gas or oil, or as gas or oil is found in paying
quantities thereon or stored thereunder, or as long as said land is
used for the storage of gas or the protection of gas storage on
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *8.
812 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 335.
Id. at 336.
Id.
Id.
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lands in the general vicinity of said land. It is understood that a
well need not be drilled on the leased premises to permit the
storage of gas thereunder and the Lessee shall be the sole judge
of when and if said land is being used for the storage of gas or
the protection of gas storage on lands in the general vicinity of
said land. 86
K & D filed a complaint claiming that because EQT has not produced or
sold gas for a period greater than 24 months the lease had been
abandoned. 87 Acting sua sponte, the district court found that the lease was
divisible as a matter of law.88 According to the district court, the portion of
the property being used for protection of stored gas remained under lease
while the portion that was not used for exploration or production had
expired. 89 The Court of Appeals had no reservation reversing the District
Court, finding that the plain terms of the Durational Provision prevented
this lease from being divisible.90 The case was reversed and remanded with
instructions to enter judgment in favor of the lessees.
In Leggett v. EQT Production Co., 91 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of West Virginia certified two questions to the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The questions are:
1. Does Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C., 633
S.E.2d 22 (2006), which was decided after the enactment of
West Virginia Code § 22-6-8, have any effect upon the Court's
decision as to whether a lessee of a flat-rate lease, converted
pursuant to West Virginia Code § 22-6-8, may deduct postproduction expenses from his lessor's royalty, particularly with
respect to the language of “1/8 at the wellhead” found in West
Virginia Code § 22-6-8(e)?
2. Does West Virginia Code § 22-6-8 prohibit flat-rate royalties
only for wells drilled or reworked after the statute's enactment
and modify only royalties paid on a per-well basis where permits
for new wells or to modify existing wells are sought, or do the

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id. at 340.
No. 1:13CV4, 2016 WL 297714 (N.D.W. Va. Jan. 22, 2016).
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provisions of West Virginia Code § 22-6-8 abrogate flat-rate
leases in their entirety? 92
In Leggett, the lease in question was a 1906 lease providing for a royalty
of $300.00 per year per well (a flat-rate royalty). 93 West Virginia has a flatrate well statute that provides that owners of the oil and gas are to receive
not less than one eighth of the total amount paid to or received
by or allowed to the owner of the working interest at the
wellhead for the oil or gas so extracted, produced or marketed
before deducting the amount to be paid to or set aside for the
owner of the oil or gas in place, on all such oil or gas to be
extracted, produced or marketed from the well.94
In Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources., LLC, 95 the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that “at the wellhead” language
contained in a lease does not allow the producer to deduct post-production
expenses from the royalty payment. 96 Thus, the lessors claim that their
royalties were improperly calculated, calling into question what “at the
wellhead” means within the flat-rate well statute. 97
Of relevance, here, is the breach of contract claim against EQT which the
court deferred pending answers from the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. 98
In EQT Production Co. v. Wender, 99 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment in favor
of EQT, finding that a Fayette County ordinance banning the storage,
disposal, or use of oil and natural gas waste in the county was preempted by
state law and thus void. 100

92. See Fout v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:15CV68, 2016 WL 868279 (N.D.W. Va. Mar. 7,
2016). Fout is very similar, factually, to Leggett. In Fout, plaintiffs’ motions were denied
without prejudice as the court awaits answers from the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. Id.
93. Leggett, 2016 WL 868279 at *2.
94. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6-8(e) (West 2016) (emphasis added).
95. 633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006).
96. Id. at 30.
97. Leggett, 2016 WL 868279 at *1.
98. Id. at *14.
99. No. 16-000290, 2016 WL 3248503 (S.D.W. Va. June 10, 2016).
100. Id. at *16.
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III. Statutory Developments
The Second Session of the Eighty-second Legislature of West Virginia
was a busy time for our State Senators and Delegates, more so over a
budget battle, but bills were introduced and passed affecting oil and gas
development in the state. 101
There was focus on taxes, fees and safety in the oil and gas industry in
the legislation introduced during the last legislative session.
Senate Bill 491 terminated an additional severance tax on natural gas. 102
Senate Bill 505 exempted certain uses of field gas from the motor fuel
excise tax. Field gas is defined as natural gas “extracted from a production
well, storage well, gathering system, pipeline, main or transmission line that
is used as fuel to power field equipment.” 103 As long as this gas is not used
on the public roads and the royalty payments have been made to the mineral
owners, this gas is exempt from the motor fuel excise tax.104 Senate Bill
592 amended W. Va. Code §24B-5-3, allowing the Public Service
Commission to levy a rate of $18.60 per mile of three-inch equivalent
pipeline as a special license fee.105
House Bill 4218 revised the definition of “underground facility” relating
to the One-call system in W. Va. Code § 24C-1-2. Of relevance,
“underground facility” means
any underground pipeline facility, owned by a utility and
regulated by the Public Service Commission, which is used in
the transportation or distribution of gas, oil or a hazardous
liquid; any underground pipeline facility, owned by a company
subject to the jurisdiction of the federal energy regulatory
commission, which is used in the gathering, transportation or
distribution of gas, oil or a hazardous liquid; any underground
production or gathering pipeline for gas, oil, or any hazardous
substance with a nominal inside diameter in excess of four
inches and that is not otherwise subject to one-call reporting
requirements under federal or state law . . . .106

101. For a complete list of completed legislation in West Virginia, go to
http://www.legis.state.wv.us.
102. S. 491, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016)
103. S. 505, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016).
104. Id.
105. S. 592, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016).
106. H.R. 4218, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016).
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House Bill 4323 requires pipeline operators and well operators to report
incidents to the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management at the Mine and Industrial Accident Call Center within fifteen
minutes of ascertaining the occurrence of an incident at a well, well pad, or
pipeline facility. An “incident” is defined as:
(A) An injury to an individual at a well, well pad or pipeline
facility that results in death or 5 serious bodily injury or that has
a reasonable potential to cause death;
(B) An unintended confinement of an individual in an enclosed
space at a well, well pad or pipeline facility from which a person
will not be released for a period exceeding fifteen minutes;
(C) The unintended ignition or explosion of oil, natural gas or
other substance at a well, well pad or pipeline facility;
(D) An unintended fire in or about a well, well pad or pipeline
facility not extinguished within fifteen minutes of discovery of
the unintended fire; and
(E) Any unintended release of poisonous or combustible
substances that have a reasonable potential to cause death.107

107. H.R. 4323, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016).
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